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ON RAISING: A REANAL YSIS OF S·DELETION * 
Hong Bae Lee 
The paper discusses a number of problems in connection with Chomsky's S-deletion 
approach to the analysis of 'exceptional Case-marking' verbs such as believe, and pro-
poses a n~w approach to the effect that English contains a + complementizer that can 
govern and assign Case, unlike Kayne's (1981) + complementizer, and that a verb may 
subcategorize a non-argument as its complements, contradicting Chomsky's claim, 
"Complements of X are always6·positions." The new approach is proved to meet re-
quirements of the principles in the GB theory: the6-criterion, the Case Filter, the Pro-
jection Principle and the Binding theory. 
o. In this paper, I will argue that English constructions acounted for by means 
of S-deletion mechanism are not an exceptional phenomenon which calls for a special 
treatment in syntax. In particular, I will demonstrate that constructions involving 
the so-called 'exceptional Case-marking' verbs like believe may be accounted for 
in a principled way by assuming that they require a particular type of infinitival 
complement clause, just as 'ordinary' verbs such as want and try require their respec-
tive type of infinitival complement clause as in (1) and (2): 
(I) a. John wants to leave the town. 
b. John wants me to leave the town. 
c. * John wants that I leave the town. 
(2) a. John tries to leave the town. 
b. * John tries me to leave the town. 
c. *John tries that I leave the town. 
In the lexicon, the verb want wiIl be specified as taking a clausal complement 
with both afar complementizer l and an e(mpty) complementizer, whereas the verb 
try is specified as taking a clausal complement only with an e complementizer. Thus, 
we may represent the D-structures of sentences (Ib) and (2a) as in (3a) and (b), 
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respectively2: 
(3) a. John wants [s[coMPfor] [sme to leave the town]] 
b. John tries [s[COMpe] [sPRO to leave the town]] 
Sentence (Ib) is grammatical, because in (3a) the prepositional complementizer 
for can govern3 and Case-mark the following noun phrase (Le., subject NP of the 
infinitival complement). On the other hand, sentence (2b) containing a 'specified' 
complement subject is ungrammatical, because its complement subject position is 
ungoverned: the e complementizer is not a governor. This means that the subject 
of a complement in structures like (3b) can only be PR04, hence only sentence 
(2a) is grammatical. Note that (2b) is ungrammatical due to the fact that its com-
plement subject me is unable to receive Case, as required by the Case Filters. 
1. It has been known that the form of a complement is generally determined by 
the main verb of a sentence in which it is embedded. To be more specific, it is deter-
mined by the type of complementizer that it is allowed to take. Consider the following 
sentences: 
(4) a. John mentioned that Mary had left the town. 
b. * John mentioned (for) Mary to have left the town. 
c. * John mentioned to leave the town. 
(5) a. John preferred (for) Mary to leave the town. 
b. John preferred that Mary should leave the town. 
c. John preferred to leave the town. 
(6) a., John forced me to leave the town. 
b. * John forced me (for) Mary to leave the town. 
c. *John forced (me) that I should leave the town. 
(7) a. John persuaded me to leave the town. 
b. *John persuaded me (for) Mary to leave the town. 
c. John persuaded me that I should leave the town. 
2 All syntactic representations are simplified, specifying only those syntactic properties relevant 
for the discussion. 
3 The notion of government is defined as follows: 
a governs y in [/3 ... y .• • a, . . y • .• ], where 
(i) a= XO 
(ii) where + is a maximal projection, if + dominates y then + dominates a 
(iii) a c-commands y 
4 In the GB framework, PRO must appear in an ungoverned position (Chomsky 1981: 56); thus, 
the following are ungrammatical: 
(i) *PRO loves Mary 
(ii) * John loves PRO 
(iii) *John talks to PRO 
sThe Case Filter is defined as follows (Chomsky 1981: 49): 
*NP if NP has phonetic content and has no Case 
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As shown in (4) and (5), the verbs mention and prefer are identical in that they 
both may take a clausal complement, but different in the kind of complementizer 
they allow for their complement to take: the verb mention allows only a that com-
plementizer, while the verb prefer allows any complementizer in English (Le., that, 
for, and e complementizers). We can say the same thing as to verbs in (6) and (7). 
Force and persuade have an identical subcategorization frame in which they may 
occur, both taking an object NP and a clausal complement, but differ from each 
other in the kind of complementizer they 'permit their complements to take: force 
permits only an e complementizer, and persuade permits both e and that complemen-
tizers. Therefore, it seems that it is not too much to say that almost all verbs in 
English (perhaps, in all natural languages) are 'exceptional' as far as their comple-
ment structures are concerned. 
2. Turning to the main issue of the paper, consider the following sentences: 
(8) a. John believes Mary to be happy. 
b. John berlieves that Mary is happy. 
c. *John believes for Mary to be happy. 
d. * John believes to be happy. 
Naturally, a question arises as to how to deal with grammaticality problems in 
sentences like (8). Is there any logical reason for us to account for the problems 
differently, deviating from the logic of the preceding section? Can't we simply say 
that the sentences in (8a) and (b) are grammatical because the verb believe permits 
a certain complementizer in the case of the former and a that complementizer in 
the case of the latter to introduce their complement, just as we say that (8c) and 
(d) are ungrammatical because the verb does not allow their complement to accom-
pany either for complementizer or e complementizer? It is obvious that we cannot 
account for the grammaticality of sentence (8a) with the existing complementizer 
system of English. For example, we cannot analyze (8a) in the same way as we 
analyze sentences like (lb), for we can easily find a number of syntactic contrasts 
between want-type verbs and believe-type verbs. 
Unlike want-type verbs, the verb believe does not take a complement clause having 
PRO subject: 
(9) a. John wants to be happy. 
b. *John believes to be happy. 
The verb want may take a complement clause with the complementizer for when 
it is not adjacent to the main verb of the sentence, but the verb believe may not, 
regardless of the adjacency of its complement clause to the main verb: 
(10) a. John wants very much for Mary to be happy. 
b. *John believes very deeply for Mary to be happy. 
As shown in (11), the verb believe takes as its infinitival complement subject a reflex-
ive pronoun coreferential with subject of the main sentence, but the verb want does 
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not: 
(11)a. *John wants himself to be happy. 
b. John believes himself to be happy. 
The verb believe has a passive counterpart as in (12b), but the verb want does not: 
(12)a. *Mary is wanted to be happy. 
b. Mary is believed to be happy. 
Two approaches have been proposed to solve problems involving sentences like 
(8a): the S-deletion approach suggested by Chomsky (1981) and the ~ complemen-
tizer approach suggested by Kayne (1981). We will discuss Chomsky's S-deletion, 
first. 
Chomsky claims that verbs like believe are specified in the lexicon as taking a 
clausal complement with an e complementizer. Thus, we may represent the D-
structure of sentence (8a) as in (13): 
(13) John believes [s[COMpe) [sMary to be happy)) 
Since, as we have observed above, the e complementizer cannot govern and Case-
mark its infinitival complement subject, there is no way to assign Case to the embedd-
ed subject in structures like (13). Chomsky, therefore, proposes deletion ofS-node, 
which functions as a barrier to government6 , from the structure in (13), the result 
of which is (14): 
(14) John believes [sMary to be happy) 
\ 
Elimination of the barrier to government, S-node, makes it possible for the verb 
believe to govern, and assign Case to, its infinitival complement subject across the 
S boundary in (14), hence sentence (8a) being grammatical. 
It is not difficult to see how the S-deletion approach acounts for the ungram-
maticality of sentences like (8d) containing a PRO complement subject. In (14) 
the complement subject position is governed by the verb believe, which means that 
PRO cannot appear in this position. Recall that PRO appears only in an ungovern-
ed position (cf. fn. 4). 
Chomsky (1981) extends his S-deletion mechanism to constructions involving 
'raising' predicates. Consider the sentences in (15): 
(15)a. John seems to be happy. 
b. John is likely to be happy. 
The D-structure of (15a), for example, is represented as in (16): 
(16) [Npe) seems [sfcOMpe) [sJohn to be happyJ) 
The application of Move-a to (16) generates a structure like (17): 
6 Besides S, NP is also regarded as a barrier to government in English. 
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(17) John seems [S[COMpe] [st to be happy]] 
(17) cannot be a well-formed structure as it is, because it contains a t(race) occupy-
ing an ungoverned position7. The complementize e may not govern the t in (17) 
by definition, and the verb seem may not either because S-node, a barrier to govern-
ment, intervenes between the verb and t. Accordingly, Chomsky proposes to 
eliminate the barrier to government from (17), deriving a structure like (18) from (17): 
(18) John seems [st to be happy] 
The tin (18) is now governed by the verb seem, meeting one of the requirements 
of the theory. Note that the infinitival complement subject John in (16) has to move 
to the empty matrix subject position, where it can be assigned Case, since intran-
sitive predicates like seem, likely, etc. cannot assign Case to their complement sub-
ject. It is clear from ungrammaticality of sentences like (19) that John cannot receive 
Case from its D-structure position in (16): 
(19) *It seems John to be happy. 
Kayne (1981) proposes an entirely different analysis of the infinitival comple-
ment of believe-type verbs, which we will call the f complementizer approach. 
He assumes that verbs like believe take a f complementizer for their infinitival 
complement, and claims that f is a prepositional complementizer, which can 
govern and Case-mark the adjacent infinitival subject NP, just as another English 
prepositional complementizer for can. But the former differs from the latter in having 
no phonetic realization. He suggests that we represent the D-structure of a sentence 
like (8a) as in (20): 
(20) John believes [s[coMPf] [sMary to be happy]] 
In (20) the infinitival complement subject Mary receives Case from the complemen-
tizer f, but not from the verb believe, as Chomsky (1981) assumes. It is clear from 
the structure of (20) that PRO may not be subject of the complement, because its 
position is governed by f. 
Kayne extends his assumption to other facts in English; he believes that the fact 
that a prepositional complementizer can assign Case to the adjacent complement 
subject in English entails the fact that the language allows preposition stranding 
as in (21): 
. (21) John can be relied on. 
He claims that only those elements that govern and assign Case 'in the same way' 
can be reanalyzed. In English both verbs and prepositions can govern and assign 
7 Chomsky (1981: 56) specifies properties of trace as follows: 
(i) trace is governed 
(ii) the antecedent of trace is not in a 8-position 
(iii) the antecedent-trace relation satisfies the subjacency condition 
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Case 'structurally' (Le., in the same way), whereas in French verbs can govern and 
assign Case structurally, but prepositions can do so only by subcategorization, hence 
the possibility of preposition stranding being ruled out as seen in (22): 
(22) a. *Quel candidat as-tu vote pour? 
'Which candidate have you voted for?' 
b. * Jean a ete vote contre par presque tous. 
'John was voted against by almost everybody.' 
However, in English structures like (23) can be reanalyzed as in (24), which gives 
rise to preposition stranding in (21): 
(23) [Npe] can be relied [pp[pon] [NpJohn]] 
(24) [Npe) can be [vrelied on] [NpJohn] 
I believe that Kayne's analysis of the infinitival complement of English believe-type 
verbs is essentially on the right track. 
As Bouchard (1983) indicates, however, Kayne's analysis contains a number of 
problems. First of all, as Kayoe himself admits, French allows the reanalysis of verb 
and noun, although they hardly govern and assign Case in the same way: 
(25) Je veux que soit mis fin a la guerre. 
'1 want that be put an end to the war.' 
Secondly, it is not always easy to distinguish 'configurationally' between struc-
tural Case assignment and Case assignment by subcategorization, because in the 
GB framework both subcategorization and structural Case are defined in terms of 
the notion of government (cf. fn. 3). For example, a verb must govern an element 
in order to Case-mark and subcategorize it; similarly, it must be governed to be 
structurally Case-marked. 
Another problem was noted by Chomsky (1981); the if! complementizer approach 
cannot provide a natural account of the differerce between believe and want with 
respect to the passive8 : 
(26) a. John is believed to be happy. 
b. *John is wanted to be happy. 
In Kayne's analysis, the D-structures of (26a) and (b) would be represented as in 
(27a) and (b), respectively: 
(27) a. [Npe] is believed [s[coMPforif!] [sJohn to be happy]] 
b. [Npe] is wanted [~lcoMpfor] [sJohn to be happy]] 
Both structures in (27) are regarded as containing prepositional complementizers. 
But only (27a) can be the source of a grammatical passive sentence like (26a) . 
. It is obvious that Kayne's system cannot provide a natural account as to why this 
is so. In the S-deletion approach, however, the Case that is to be absorbed by passive 
8 In the following section, we will see that passive also causes some trouble in Chomsky's S-deletion. 
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morphology is assigned by the verb believed itself in (26a), whereas it is the com-
plementizer for, not the verb want, that assign Case in (27b), which cannot be 
absorbed by passive morphology (cf. (13a), (13) and (14), and see the following 
section for further discussion). 
Finally, we may raise a question as to Kayne's claim that the English language 
must contain two prepositional complementizers whose syntactic functions are ex-
actly the same: both + and for can govern and Case-mark their adjacent infinitival 
complement subject. (See Bouchard (1983) for further discussion of the problems 
in Kayne's analysis.) 
3. In this section, we will discuss problems in connection with Chomsky's S-deletion 
approach. Chomsky claims that his S-deletion is a 'marked' (Le., exceptional) 
phenomenon in English. When we say that a certain linguistic fact is marked or 
exceptional, we generally mean that it is found in extremely restricted environment. 
Consider, however, where Chomsky's S-deletion may take place. It seems that it 
takes place in all kinds of complement constructions. In English, a clausal comple-
ment may follow an intransitive predicate, a transitive predicate, or a verb + an 
object NP. Thus, we have the following sets of sentences: 
(28) intransitive predicate + clausal complement 
a. John seems to be happy: S-deletion 
b. it seems that John is happy: that complementizer 
c. it is important for you to come early: for complementizer 
d. it is unclear what to do: e complementizer 
(29) transitive predicate + clausal complement 
a. John believes Mary to be happy: S-deletion 
b. John said that he was happy: that complementizer 
c. John preferred for you to come early: for complementizer 
d. John tried to come early: e complementizer 
(30) verb + object NP + clausal complement 
a. John impressed Mary as intelligent: S-deletion 
b. John told me that he was happy: that complementizer 
c. it would please John very much for Mary to be happy: 
for complementizer 
d. John persuaded Mary to come early: e complementizer 
We may ask whether there is any logical necessity for us to treat the (a) sentences 
in (28)-(30) differently from the rest. I believe that it is more natural and theoretical-
ly more plausible to analyze the (a) sentences above in the way that we analyze the 
rest of sentences than to employ an ad hoc device like S-deletion, if possible. 
Compare those complementizers, with respect to government and Case-marking, 
that may introduce an infinitival complement, including Kayne's + complementizer: 
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(31) ,--- complmentizers govern assign Case 
e NO NO 
1----
for YES YES 
; YES YES 
Logically, we may add two more complementizers to (31): one that can govern but 
cannot assign Case, and one that can assign Case but cannot govern. The latter 
is impossible in the GB framework, because an element must govern in order to 
be able to assign Case. What about a complementizer that can govern but cannot 
assign Case? As far as I know, nothing in the theory prevents a language from con-
taining such a complementizer, for we easily find such elements in other parts of 
speech: adjectives like likely, certain, etc., verbs like seem, appear, etc., and past 
participle form of transitive verbs are such elements. 
Suppose that Kayne's complementizer;, which he claims can govern and assign 
Case, is the complementizer that can govern but cannot assign Case. In other words, 
assume that English has the following complementizer system for its infinitival com-
plements instead of (31): 
(32) 
complmentizers govern assign Case 
e NO NO 
for YES YES 
; YES NO 
Suppose, further, that all the predicates that are assumed to trigger S-deletion by 
Chomsky take a ; complementizer. Then sentence (28a), for example, would have 
(33), rather than (16), as its D-structure: 
(33) [Npe] seems [S[COMP;] [sJohn to be happy]] 
Since, by definition, the infinitival complement subject John cannot receive Case 
in its D-structure position in (33), it has to move to the position where it can be 
assigned Case, i.e., to the position of matrix subject as in (34): 
(34) John seems [s[COMPtf] [st to be happy]] 
Note that (34) is different from (17) in that the position occupied by t is governed 
in the former, meeting the requirement of the theory (cf. fn. 7). 
4. One would immediately recognize problems in the present proposal in connec-
tion with exceptional Case-marking verbs like believe. Suppose that the D-structure 
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of sentence (29a) is represented as in (35): 
(35) John believes [S[COMP+] [sMary to be happy]] 
The complementizer +, by definition, cannot assign Case to Mary in (35) (cf. (32». 
Therefore, (35) may not be a well-formed structure for any sentence in English, 
because it violates the Case Filter. Then, what kind of structure is appropriate for 
sentences like (29a)? I propose that the D-structure of (29a) be represented as 
in (36): 
(36) John believes [Npe] [g[COMP+] [sMary to be happy]] 
The derivation of sentence (29a) from (36) is straightforward: Move-a moves 
the complement subject Mary to the empty object position of the sentence, generating 
(37): 
(37) John believes Mary [g[COMP+] [st to be happy]] 
Chomsky (1981: 99-100) explicitly rejects the idea of deriving sentence (29a) 
from a structure like (36). He says that sentence (39) is considerably less acceptable 
than sentence (38): 
(38) I told Bill myself to leave the room 
(39) I expected (believed) Bill myself to be a liar 
Chomsky assumes that (38) and (39) are derived from (40) and (41), respectively, 
by applying Move-a to myself. 
(40) I myself told Bill [sPRO to leave the room] 
(41) I myself expected (believed) [Bill to be a liar] 
"Then Move-a can move myself either to the left or the right boundary of the 
embedded clause .... " (Chomsky 1981: 99). Assuming (39) to derive from (42) 
rather than (41), we cannot account for the low degree of acceptability of (39). 
(42) a. I myself expected (believed) Bill [to be a liar] 
h. I myself expected (believed) Bill [PRO to be a liar] 
Another example that Chomsky puts forth to support his claim is, " ... although 
insertion of adverbs and other quantifiers is fairly free so that the distinctions are 
not sharp, there is surely a tendency in the direction of preferring" (Chomsky 1981: 
100) (43) to (44): 
(43) a. John promised Bill sincerely to visit him tomorrow. 
h. John forced Bill angrily to leave. 
(44) John expected (believed) Bill sincerely to be more forthcoming. 
Compare Chomsky's (39) and (44) with (45) and (46), respectively: 
(45) I wanted Bill myself to be a liar. 
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(46) John wanted Bill sincerely to be more forthcoming. 
(45) and (46) are considerably less acceptable than (39) and (44), which means that 
Chomsky's arguments do not wholly support his conclusion on the structure of 
believe-type verbs. 
Let's return to (36) and (37). The a-criterion9 of the theory requires that an argu-
ment (Le., an NP) move to a non-a-position. This means that the position Mary 
occupies in (37) must be a non-a-position. Chomsky (1981: 47) claims, however, 
"The position of subject mayor may not be a a-position, depending on properties 
of the associated VP. Complements of X are always a-positions .... " As far as 
I know, Chomsky has not given any logical and/ or theoreti~al reason why his claim 
must be maintained even in the GB framework. If there are verbs or VPs that may 
or may not a-mark subject, then we can logically expect that there may be verbs 
that mayor may not a-mark their complements. 
I believe that idiom chunks provide direct evidence against Chomsky's claim; 
in verb-object idioms like take advantage (of), keep tabs (on), pay attention (to), 
etc., object NPs (i.e., complements) of verbs are not a-marked. Chomsky (1981: 
37) says, "In the case of the idiom "take advantage of Bill," for example, no ac-
tual a-role is assigned to advantage, though we might say that the idiom rule that 
converts the phrase "take advantage of" into a derived lexical item permits this 
derived item to a-mark the object Bill." 
Another piece of evidence that strongly supports the claims that a transitive verb 
may have a non-argument as its complement is found in the following example: 
(47) a. John believes it that Mary is sick. (Gueron 1981: 103) 
b. I believe it with no difficulty that John has convinced Bill. 
(Rosenbaum 1967: 58) 
c. They doubt it that you will go. (Rosenbaum 1967: 34) 
d. John would hate it for him to win. (Chomsky 1981: 190) 
e· She did not like it that Jasper should shoot birds. (Woolf 1927: 90) 
Where does this pleonastic non-argument it come from in (47)? It cannot come 
into being by the result of application of a traditional transformational rule called 
"Extraposition," by which we used to derive sentences in (48): 
(48) a. It is obvious that the world is round. 
b. It was proved by Magellan that the world is round. 
c. It might be unwise for Suzie to buy a polar bear. 
It seems that the GB theory allows only what we used to call "Extrapostion from 
NP," which does not leave behind a pleonastic expression like it: compare the 
sentences in (49) (cf. Chomsky 1981: 56). 
9 The B-criterion is defined as follows (Chomsky 1981: 36): 
Each argument bears one and only one B-role, and each B-role is assigned to one and only one argument. 
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(49) a. A man who John knows was here. 
b. A man was here who John knows. 
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The only possible source of it in (47), I believe, is the consequence of applica-
tion of the same rule (perhaps, in the PF component) that inserts it in the non-O-
position of subject in sentences like (48). Since a non-O-position cannot be brought 
into being by applying Move-a, it must be generated in the base. If my argument 
is correct, sentences like (47) strongly support the legitimacy of structure (36). 
Next, consider the following sentence from Chomsky (1981: 125): 
(50) It was believed that the conclusion was false. 
The D-structure of (50) is represented by Chomsky as in (5): 
(51) [Npe] was believed [sthat the conclusion was false] 
No movement is involved in deriving (50) from (51); simple insertion of it into the 
non-O-position of the subject converts (51) into (50). Chomsky (1981: 124) claims, 
however, " ... the unique property of the passive morphology is that it in effect 
"absorbs" Case: one NP in the VP with the passive verb as head is not assigned 
Case under government by this verb." Move-a has to apply to structures like (52), 
for example, because Case of John is absorbed by its passive morphology. 
(52) [Npe] was killed John 
The passive morphology of (51), however, does not have the "unique property 
of the passive morphology": that is, no NP within the VP with the passive verb 
as head has 'potential Case' that is to be absorbed by the passive morphology in 
(51). If we allow the passive morphology to occur even when there is no Case that 
is to be absorbed by it, how can we rule out (53) as non-sentences in English? 
(53) a. It is seemed that John is happy. 
b. John is seemed to be happy. 
Suppose, however, that the D-structure of (50) is something like (54): 
(54) [Npe] was believed [Npe] [sthat the conclusion was false] 
Unlike (51), (54) contains an NP (governed by the verb believed) whose Case can 
be absorbed by its passive morphology. If the present proposal is accepted, we have 
to reconsider Chomsky's claim (1981: 125), " ... , passive morphology, ... , is 
not necessarily associated with movement and assumption of a new OF." 
Koster (1978)10 makes a claim similar to the present proposal as to the structure 
of believe-type verbs having an infinitival complement. He says, " ... , there does 
10 Koster's theory differs from Chomsky's in that the former contains no transformation like 
Move-a. 
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not seem to be an obvious argument against (56) as a deep structure" (Koster 1978: 
146) of sentence (55): 
(55) John believes the dog to be hungry. 
(56) John believes the dog j [sej to be hungry] 
Then, he claims, "If we assume non-argument status for the NP-objects of verbs 
like believe" (Koster 1978: 146), we can naturally account for all sentences in (57): 
(57) a. Joan believes there to be trouble in the Congo. 
b. Joan believes the shit to be about to hit the fan. 
c. Joan believes the jig to be up. 
d. Joan believes little heed to have been paid to my suggestion. 
I am not going to review various arguments for and/or against object status of 
the infinitival complement subject vf a believe-type verb (See Brame (1979), Bresnan 
(1976), and Postal (1974». It seems that there are as many arguments support;ng 
object status of the infinitival complement subject in sentences like (29a) as those 
supporting its subject status. 
We may employ the present claim for analysis of small clauses in English. Con-
sider the following sentences: 
(58) a. John considers Bill to be foolish. 
b. John impressed me as intelligent. 
The D-structures of the sentences above will be represented as in (59a) and (b), 
respectively, in the present system: 
(59) a. John considers [Npe] [s1>[sBill to be foolish]] 
b. [Npe] impresses me [s1>[sJohn as intelligent]] 
The derivation of (58) from (59) is straightforward: Move-a moves the complement 
subject to the empty NP position, where it can be assigned Case, as required by 
the Case Filter. Obviously, the present analysis can do away with Chomsky's ad 
hoc principle (60) (Chomsky 1981: 107): 
(60) Small clauses are not maximal projections 
5. Let's consider here whether the present proposal meets the requirements 
stipulated in the Principles of the GB theory. Specifically, we will consider whether 
the structures of (36) and (37) satisfy the a-criterion, the Case Filter, the Projection 
Principle and the Binding theory. 
Needless to say that (37) meets the a-criterion, because the object NP receives 
its a-role from its D-structure position in (36). Note that the position that Mary 
moves to is a non-a-position. On the other hand, Mary receives its Case from S-
structure position in (37), hence the Case Filter being satisfied. As is the case in 
(33), the infinitival complement subject in (36) has to find, or move to, a position 
where it can be assigned Case, because the complementizer 1> can govern but cannot 
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assign Case. 
The Projection Principle of the GB theory requires that all syntactic representa-
tions (i.e., LF, and S- and D-structure) observe the subcategorization properties 
of lexical items (cf. Chomsky 1981: 27)1l. It is obvious that the D-structure (36) 
and the S-structure (37) of. sentence (29a) do not violate the Projection Principle; 
the verb believe is specified as having the subcategorization feature [ __ NP S] in 
the lexicon, exactly like verbs such as persuade. But believe is different from per-
suade in that the object NP is a non-argument in the former. 
Finally, let's examine whether the tin (37) observes principles of the Binding 
theory. An NP-trace, which is classified as anaphor in the GB theory, must obey 
principle (A) of the Binding theory: an anaphor is bound in its governing category'2 
(Chomsky 1981: 188). Since in (37) the matrix S is the minimal sentence containing 
t and its governor +, it is the governing category. The trace t is bound by its antece-
dent Mary in (37), meeting principle (A) of the Binding theory. 
So far, we have found no violations of principles of the GB theory, which means 
that the present proposal can be integrated naturally into the general framework 
of the theory. 
II The exact definition of the Projection Principle is as follows (Chomsky 1981: 38): 
(i) if {J is an immediate constituent of y in (5) at L i• and y= ii, then all-marks {J in y 
(ii) if a selects {J in y as lexical property, then a selects {J in at Li 
(iii) if « selects {J in y at L i, then « selects {J in y at Li 
12« is the governing category for {J if and only if a is the minimal category containing {J and a 
governor of {J, where «= NP or S (Chomsky 1981: 188). 
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